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Introduction
Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), foreign
states are presumptively immune from suits in U.S. courts unless one of
several enumerated exceptions applies. I Of these exceptions, the most fre-
quently litigated is § 1605(a)(2)'s commercial activity provision, which
states that:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case- ... in which the action is based
upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign
state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the
territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the
T J.D./Master en Droit, 2020 Cornell Law School and the Universit6 Paris 1
Pantheon-Sorbonne. Publishing Editor, Cornell Law Review, Vol. 104. Many thanks to
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1. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604.
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foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United
States .... 2
For a provision that some commentators have labelled as the "heart" of the
FSIA, 3 the statute leaves the term "commercial activity" curiously unde-
fined. 4 The commercial activity exception embodies the FSIA's restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity,5 according to which foreign states are not
entitled to immunity when they act as private players in the marketplace. 6
Nevertheless, the FSIA offers little by way of guidance on how to interpret
this term, explaining only that commercial activity "means either a regular
course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or
act" 7 and that the "character of an activity shall be determined by reference
to the nature of the course of conduct ... rather than by reference to its
purpose."8
The FSIA's obscurity on what constitutes "commercial activity" has
given rise to a significant body of federal case law that attempts to define
the term. This Note focuses on a particular line of decisions within that
case law, wherein courts have been confronted with sovereign states engag-
ing in commercial arrangements to license, market, export, or develop nat-
ural resources. Beginning with the Ninth Circuit's 1984 decision in MOL,
Inc. v. People's Republic of Bangladesh,9 (MOL) courts have generally con-
cluded that transactions involving natural resources are inherently sover-
eign in nature, and therefore do not fall within the commercial activity
exception's ambit. As a result, the foreign state is entitled to immunity
under the FSIA. This Note challenges that principle, which it dubs the
"natural resource rule," arguing that certain natural-resource related trans-
actions should qualify as commercial activity based on a multi-factor bal-
ancing test extracted from In re Complaint of Sedco,10 which considered the
issue two years before the Ninth Circuit in MOL.
Courts assessing the commercial activity exception engage in a two-
pronged analysis, asking first if the foreign states' conduct constitutes com-
mercial activity and second if the plaintiffs claims are based upon that
activity. The natural resource rule comes into play at the initial step, which
is where this Note contends the new Sedco test should apply in its stead.
The Sedco test assesses whether a dispute involving natural resources
should fall within the commercial activity exception based on: 1) the geo-
2. Id. § 1605(a)(2).
3. See JosEPH W. DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR CORPORA-
TIONS 351 (2003).
4. See Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 612 (1992) (noting that the
statute "leaves the critical term 'commercial' largely undefined"); Joan E. Donoghue, Tak-
ing the "Sovereign" out of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: A Functional Approach to
the Commercial Activity Exception, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 489, 490-91, 499 (1992).
5. See 28 U.S.C. § 1602; DELLAPENNA, supra note 3, at 351.
6. See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 613-14.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
8. Id.
9. 736 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1984).
10. 543 F. Supp. 561 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
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graphical location of the natural resource; 2) the degree of government
control over the natural resource; and 3) the existence of a for-profit con-
tract between the state and a private party. This Note does not define the
term "natural resource," and neither does the case law that it addresses. 1
This Note is concerned with how the commercial activity analysis proceeds
once courts have made the initial determination that a natural resource is
in play, not with the legal parameters of the term.
The FSIA constitutes an exception for sovereign states to the normal
jurisdictional rules that govern when parties are subject to suit in US
courts. The commercial activity provision is a carveout within that broad
exception-it deprives sovereign states of their exceptional immunity when
they engage in commercial conduct. Within this framework, courts have
used the natural resource rule to circumvent the commercial activity
carveout and restore immunity to sovereign states. This Note argues that
the rule should be abandoned in favor of a much more limited test, thereby
increasing the number of sovereign states that would be subject to suit in
US courts. Part I addresses the MOL case, its doctrinal foundations, and
its progeny. Part II analyzes In re Complaint of Sedco, extrapolating a new
test from the case for when transactions involving natural resources count
as commercial and applying the test to existing case law. Part II also
addresses and rejects alternative rules for situating natural resource-related
cases within the commercial activity exception. 1 2
I. The Natural Resource Rule
A. MOL and its Doctrinal Foundation
The natural resource rule traces back to the Ninth Circuit's 1984 rul-
ing in MOL, Inc. v. People's Republic of Bangladesh. The Ninth Circuit relied
on a mix of district court, appellate, and Supreme Court precedent to craft
a solution in the face of an unusual fact pattern. This section dissects
those facts as well as the Ninth Circuit's complex reasoning.
In MOL, the plaintiff-an Oregon corporation-sued Bangladesh for
terminating a ten-year licensing contract to capture and export rhesus
11. These decisions treat everything from oil, timber, gas, and minerals to monkeys
as natural resources. For possible legal definitions of a natural resource, see 43 C.F.R.
11.14(z) (including "land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water
supplies, and other such resources"); see also TOOLKIT AND GUIDANCE FOR PREVENTING
AND MANAGING LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES CONFLICT, UNITED NATIONS INTERAGENCY
FRAMEwoRK TEAM PREvENTIVE ACTION 1 (2012), http://www.un.org/en/land-natural-
resources-conflict/pdfs/EU-UN%20Introduction%20and%20overview.pdf [https://
perma.cc/YFC8-RXG3] (including "oil, gas, minerals, and timber ... land, water and
fisheries"); Glossary of Statistical Terms, OECD, https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.
asp?ID=1740 [https://perna.cc/NR36-D5XG] (last visited Feb. 25, 2019) ("Natural
resources are natural assets (raw materials) occurring in nature that can be used for
economic production or consumption.").
12. See George K. Foster, When Commercial Meets Sovereign: A New Paradigm For
Applying the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in Crossover Cases, 52 Hous. L. REv. 361,
405 (2014) (proposing a "sovereign functions" test for assessing negotiating natural
resources under the commercial activity exception).
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monkeys for scientific research. 13 The licensing agreement had all the trap-
pings of a standard commercial contract, including specified quantities
and prices, a requirement that the plaintiff construct a breeding farm for
rhesus monkeys in the future, and an arbitration clause. 14 Bangladesh
eventually cancelled the license, alleging that the plaintiff had breached its
obligation to build the breeding farm and that it had handed over a num-
ber of monkeys to the U.S. army for "neutron bomb radiation
experiments."1 5
The Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs claim that the licensing agree-
ment deprived Bangladesh of sovereign immunity under the FSIA because
it constituted commercial activity, reasoning that the agreement "con-
cerned Bangladesh's right to regulate its natural resources, . . . a uniquely
sovereign function."'16 The court explained that this was no ordinary con-
tract, but rather one "that only a sovereign could have made. .. [because] it
concerned Bangladesh's right to regulate imports and exports."'1 7 Finally,
the court rejected the contention that it was improperly relying on the pur-
pose rather than the character of the agreement: "[c]onsideration of the
special elements of export license[s] and natural resource[s] looks only to
the nature of the agreement and does not require examination of the gov-
ernment's motives."'18
The Ninth Circuit's rule in MOL stated that courts should consider
two types of acts to be inherently sovereign: (1) regulating imports or
exports and (2) regulating natural resources. 19 Thus, no matter how "com-
mercial" a course of conduct might appear, if it touched on one of these
two areas then it constituted a sovereign act outside the reach of the com-
mercial activity exception. The MOL court characterized the regulation of
imports/exports and natural resources as "sovereign prerogative[s]"
unavailable to private parties. 20 Although these two rights often overlap in
subsequent FSIA cases, courts have treated the natural resource right as a
freestanding basis for vitiating the commercial activity exception.2 1 Thus,
the import/export prerogative and the natural resource rule are not neces-
sarily co-extensive, but they are likely to arise under the same circum-
stances. This Note, however, focuses on the latter not the former.
The MOL court found doctrinal support for its holding in four cases.
First, it cited to its own decision from the previous year in Clayco Petroleum
Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. Clayco involved a suit brought by plain-
13. MOL, Inc., 736 F.2d at 1327.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1328.
16. Id. at 1329.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Med. Ctr. v. Hellenic Republic, 877 F.2d 574,
578 n.5 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that granting "a license to exploit the state's natural
resources" is not commercial activity, without referencing imports or exports).
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tiffs who lost out on a Saudi Arabian oil concession. 22 In its defense, Saudi
Arabia invoked the act of state doctrine, 23 under which "the courts of one
country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another,
done within its own territory."2 4 The Clayco court denied the plaintiffs'
assertion that an exception to the act of state doctrine for "purely commer-
cial acts" applied to Saudi Arabia's activities, concluding that "the govern-
mental action here could not have been taken by a private citizen.
Granting a concession to exploit natural resources entails an exercise of
powers peculiar to a sovereign. "25
Second, the MOL court cited to Bokkelen v. Grumman Aerospace Corp.,
where the Eastern District of New York determined that the Brazilian gov-
ernment's denial of import licenses to an airplane manufacturer was a sov-
ereign decision "covered by the act of state doctrine."'26 Third, the MOL
court referenced dicta from the Supreme Court in Alfred Dunhill of London
v. Republic of Cuba, a case where the Cuban government forcibly took pos-
session of cigar manufacturers. 27 There, the plurality explained that states
act in a commercial capacity when they do not "exercise powers peculiar to
sovereigns... [but] only those powers that can also be exercised by private
citizens."'28
The MOL court apparently had no reservations about cross-pollinat-
ing the act of state doctrine with a federal sovereign immunity statute to
craft its natural resource rule: none of the first three precedents that it
relied on are FSIA cases but rather decisions that rely on the separate act of
state doctrine. 2 9 The Supreme Court in Dunhill, however, indicated that
such a transposition is not necessarily appropriate. There, the Court
explained that "purely" commercial conduct was not an act of state, but
that § 1605(a)(2) of the FSIA does not incorporate a purity requirement for
commercial activity.30 The "pure commercial conduct" standard is what
the Clayco court looked to in assessing Saudi Arabia's oil licensing deci-
sions, and that standard almost certainly imposes a higher bar than what
the FSIA requires to find that an activity is commercial. 3 1 Moreover, Bok-
22. See Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404, 405(9th Cir. 1983).
23. See id. at 406.
24. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). See also Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964) ("The act of state doctrine in its traditional
formulation precludes the courts of this country from inquiring into the validity of the
public acts a recognized foreign sovereign power committed within its own territory.").
25. See Clayco, 712 F.2d at 408.
26. Bokkelen v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 432 F. Supp. 329, 333 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
27. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 684
(1976).
28. Id. at 704.
29. See Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Org. of Petroleum Export-
ing Countries, 649 F.2d 1354, 1360 (9th Cir. 1981) (explaining that the act of state
doctrine exists independently of the doctrine of sovereign immunity because it
"address[es] different concerns and appl[ies] in different circumstances").
30. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 695 ("[W]e decline to extend the act of state doctrine to acts
committed by foreign sovereigns in the course of their purely commercial operations").
31. See Clayco, 712 F.2d at 405.
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kelen and Dunhill had very little to do with natural resources and therefore
provide only tangential support for the category of sovereign natural
resource-related transactions that the MOL court carved out.
32
The fourth case that the MOL court relied on was LAM v. OPEC (IAM
1), where the plaintiffs sued 13 member states of the Organization of Petro-
leum Exporting Countries ("OPEC"), 33 alleging that the group's price-set-
ting activities violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act.34 The district court
rejected the plaintiffs' assertion that the commercial activity exception
applied, finding that the crux of claim was "the ability and willingness [of
the defendants] to control production of crude oil."' 35 Because this con-
duct consisted of "the establishment by a sovereign state of the terms and
conditions for the removal of a prime natural resource ... from its terri-
tory,"3 6 the district court determined that it was not "commercial" under
the FSIA.
3 7
The district court also relied on the United States' signing of consent
decrees with major oil companies as evidence that this dispute concerned
sovereign acts.3 8 In reaching its conclusion, the district court firmly
rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the relevant conduct was the defend-
ants' collective price-fixing activities rather than their individual regulation
of crude oil.3 9 The Ninth Circuit affirmed on appeal (!AM II), but declined
to find that the defendants were immune under the FSIA.4 0 Instead, the
court applied the act of state doctrine to hold that "a judicial remedy is
inappropriate regardless of whether jurisdiction exists." 4 1
Although /AM I is frequently cited in subsequent cases that adopt
MOL's natural resource rule,4 2 an attentive reading of LAM II suggests that
the Ninth Circuit was wary of adopting the district court's approach to the
commercial activity exception. In fact, Judge Herbert Choy refused to dis-
cuss the FSIA or the doctrine of sovereign immunity at all.4 3 Instead, he
invoked the act of state doctrine to circumvent the district court's discom-
fort with the "broader implications of an anti-trust action against the OPEC
32. See generally Dunhill, 425 U.S. 682; Bokkelen, 432 F. Supp. 329.
33. One of the attorneys for the OPEC defendants was Antonin Scalia, still five years
away from his nomination to the Supreme Court.
34. See Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Org. of Petroleum Export-
ing Countries, 477 F. Supp. 553, 558-59 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
35. Id. at 566-67.
36. Id. at 567.
37. Id. at 569.
38. Id. at 569-70.
39. Id. ("Plaintiff's position, however, is untenable. It is ridiculous to suggest that
the essential nature of an activity changes merely by the act of two or more countries
coming together to agree upon how they will carry on that activity. The action of sover-
eign nations coming together to agree on how each will perform certain sovereign acts
can only, itself, be a sovereign act.").
40. See Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 649 F.2d at 1358, 1362.
41. Id. at 1361-62.
42. See Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Med. Ctr., 877 F.2d at 578 n.5; In re Refined
Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 649 F. Supp. 2d 572, 596 (S.D. Tex. 2009); Liberian E.
Timber Corp. v. Gov't of Republic of Liberia, 650 F. Supp. 73, 75 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
43. See Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 649 F.2d at 1358.
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nations." 44 Judge Choy subsequently referenced the dependence of the
OPEC nations on oil for income and the precarious political repercussions
that this reliance engendered. 45 Despite this change in legal reasoning, the
outcome was the same as in !AM I-Judge Choy affirmed the district
court.
4 6
Judge Choy's pivot to the act of state doctrine is elegant as a matter of
judicial reasoning but does not address the flaws in the natural resource
rule that the LAM I court relied on. Substituting the act of state doctrine for
the natural resource rule is not a viable alternative for courts making statu-
tory determinations of sovereign immunity under the FSIA. This practice
simply externalizes a problem from one doctrine to another, without pro-
viding a solution separate from a blanket rule that when natural resources
are involved, state defendants are either immune under a) the FSIA because
their conduct is automatically sovereign or b) the act of state doctrine.
Both jurisprudential approaches improperly label commercial conduct as
sovereign, contravening the FSIA's purpose and the Supreme Court's lead-
ing precedents. 4 7
B. Development of the Natural Resource Rule
Despite its shaky doctrinal foundations, the Ninth Circuit's decision
in MOL gave rise to a small but robust set of cases adopting the rule that
natural resource transactions are inherently sovereign and fall outside the
commercial activity exception. These cases from the late 1980s strength-
ened the rule ahead of the Supreme Court's definitive rulings on commer-
cial activity in the early 90s.
In Liberian E. Timber Corp. v. Government of Republic of Liberia, the
Southern District New York held that a concession contract between the
defendant and the plaintiff to harvest timber did not qualify as commercial
activity because it involved a "regulation ... of Liberia's natural resources
and entailed an exercise of powers peculiar to a sovereign." 4 8 Like the
court in IAM II, the district court focused on the special value of the Libe-
rian forest 49 and included additional considerations of the public policy
effects stemming from the concession contract. 50
Three years later, the Seventh Circuit, in Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's
Medical Center. v. Hellenic Republic, followed the Ninth Circuit's lead,
44. Id.
45. Id. ("The importance of the alleged price-fixing activity to the OPEC nations
cannot be ignored. Oil revenues represent their only significant source of income. Con-
sideration of their sovereignty cannot be separated from their near total dependence
upon oil.").
46. Id. at 1362.
47. See infra Part I.C.
48. 650 F. Supp. at 75.
49. See id. ("[Tihe concession contract ... involved the Liberian forest, one of its
most valuable resources ....").
50. See id. (noting that the contract "was intended to bolster Liberia's economy, cre-
ate new jobs, protect the forest preserve, stimulate reforestation, and provide funds for
the needs of the people of Liberia").
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addressing the FSIA in the context of the Greek government's reimburse-
ment of doctors for the cost of kidney transplants.5 1 The court concluded
that these contracts did constitute commercial activity5 2 because private
parties routinely make agreements to "reimburse . . .health care pro-
vider[s] for the costs of performing medical services for a third party."5 3
The court's summary of the commercial activity exception is notable for
incorporating MOL's natural resource rule as black-letter law.54 Although
the court observed that, pursuant to the FSIA's legislative history, "con-
tracts for the purchase or sale of goods or services are presumptively 'com-
mercial activities[,]' '' 55 it went on to explain that "a contract whereby a
foreign state grants a private party a license to exploit the state's natural
resources is not a commercial activity, since natural resources, to the extent
they are 'affected with a public interest,' are goods in which only the sover-
eign may deal." 56
Liberian E. Timber and Rush-Presbyterian encapsulate where the natu-
ral resource rule stood after MOL and before the Supreme Court issued two
definitive rulings on the commercial activity exception in the early 1990s,
discussed infra Part I.C. Contracts and licenses to exploit natural
resources did not qualify as commercial activity, because private parties
cannot deal in these goods.5 7 The main rationale underpinning the rule
was the "inherent sovereignty" principle imported from the act of state doc-
trine, according to which natural resources implicate the "powers peculiar
to a sovereign."5 8 The cases also covered a range of activities, spanning
agreements to export, import, exploit, and harvest natural resources.
C. The Supreme Court-Weltover and Nelson
In 1992 and 1993, the Supreme Court weighed in on the commercial
activity exception. In Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, the Court held that
the petitioner, the Republic of Argentina, had engaged in commercial activ-
ity by issuing bonds to stabilize its currency. 59 The Court acknowledged
the slipperiness of the term "commercial activity," 60 but nevertheless
attempted to distinguish between the "purpose" and "nature" elements in
the FSLA:
However difficult it may be in some cases to separate "purpose" (i.e., the
reason why the foreign state engages in the activity) from "nature" (i.e., the
outward form of the conduct that the foreign state performs or agrees to
51. See 877 F.2d at 575.
52. See id. at 583.
53. Id. at 581.
54. See id. at 578-79.
55. Id. at 578 (quoting Segni v. Commercial Office of Spain, 835 F.2d 160, 164 (7th
Cir. 1987)).
56. Id. (emphasis in original).
57. See id.
58. See Clayco, 712 F.2d at 408.
59. Weltover, 504 U.S. at 620 .
60. See id. at 612 (noting that the statute "leaves the critical term 'commercial'
largely undefined").
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perform), the statute unmistakably commands that to be done. 6 1
Under this framework, the Court found that Argentina's issuance of "gar-
den-variety debt instruments"6 2 was indistinguishable from the everyday
actions of a private player in the market.63 A year later, the Court offered
further clarification in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, stating that whether or not a
state acts in the same way as a private party is a "question of behavior, not
motivation. "64
Both of these rulings pose serious problems for the natural resource
rule that the Ninth Circuit laid down 8-9 years earlier in MOL. If the
appropriate inquiry is the "outward form of the conduct that the foreign
state performs,"65 there is little question that Bangladesh's activity was
commercial-they executed a standard contract with a private party that
was "formally" identical to any other routine commercial agreement. 66
Likewise, Nelson's command that courts should examine behavior rather
than motivation conflicts with the analysis in LAM I, where the Central
District of California treated the "the ability and willingness [of the defend-
ants] to control production of crude oil" as dispositive. 67 If MOL and its
progeny are taken at face value, however, then the Supreme Court's gui-
dance in Nelson and Weltover would have little force in any dispute where
the state could plausibly claim to be dealing with a natural resource,
because this would be sufficient to transfigure an otherwise commercial
"form" into a sovereign act. 68 Finally, the Supreme Court's holdings in
Weltover and Nelson emphasized the MOL court's divergence from the
FSIA's plain text, which specifies that "character of an activity shall be
determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct ... rather
than by reference to its purpose."69 As Joan E. Donoghue explained in an
article published just before the Weltover ruling, the MOL court "examined
the foreign government policy that the activity advanced, rather than the
activity itself. As such, the court's analysis looked at least in part to the
purpose of the activity, contrary to the FSIA's instructions."70
61. Id. at 617 (citations omitted).
62. Id. at 615.
63. See id. at 614.
64. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 360 (1993).
65. Weltover, 504 U.S. at 617.
66. See MOL, Inc., 736 F.2d at 1327 (describing how the Bangladesh Ministry of
Agriculture granted MOL "a ten-year license to capture and export rhesus monkeys...
[that] specified quantities and prices").
67. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers 477 F. Supp. at 566 (emphasis
added).
68. Weltover and Nelson might also be in tension with MOL's import/export preroga-
tive. This is because imports and exports are typically arranged in commercial terms
that specify trade details such as prices, quotas, etc. (the contract at issue in MOL is a
good example). If the "outward form" of these transactions is so resolutely commercial,
it is difficult to imagine that the Weltover Court would consider all imports/exports as
sovereign activity.
69. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
70. Donoghue, supra note 4, at 502, 514.
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Weltover and Nelson should have rendered MOL obsolete by clarifying
that only outward conduct counts towards applying the commercial activ-
ity exception. As the next section explores, however, lower courts have
been reticent to relinquish the natural resource rule.
D. Continued Vitality of the Natural Resource Rule
Despite tensions with Supreme Court precedent, the natural resource
rule has yet to breathe its last and has resurfaced in at least three recent
cases. In RSM Production Corp. v. Fridman, the Southern District of New
York determined that the government of Grenada did not engage in com-
mercial activity when it terminated the plaintiffs license to conduct oil and
gas exploration off its coast because "licensing the exploitation of natural
resources is a sovereign activity."'7 1 Here, the court dismissed the fact that
Grenada had "spoken in commercial terms" when it breached the contract,
because the agreement was not one that a private citizen could have made
in the first place. 72 Similarly, the Southern District of Texas in In re
Refined Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation-another antitrust suit
brought against OPEC defendants-concluded that the only acts relevant
for the commercial activity exception were "the individual decisions of the
foreign sovereign members of the alleged conspiracy on crude oil produc-
tion levels."' 73 Again, the court concluded that these decisions must be
considered as "inherently sovereign acts" even if they were the basis of com-
mercial price-fixing negotiations among OPEC's members.74 Finally, in
2010, the Northern District of Illinois held that the state-actor defendant's
reduction of potash exports was a sovereign act, citing to Rush-
Presbyterian.75
How do we account for the continued vitality of the natural resource
rule even after Nelson and Weltover? The rule might be appealing because it
is easy to administer and apply. Given the doctrinal fog that surrounds the
commercial activity exception, it is quite straightforward for courts to point
to a natural resource as directly indicative of a sovereign act. Moreover, the
rule has strong roots in the act of state doctrine and allows courts to tiptoe
around the sensitive political issues that transactions in resources, like oil
or gas, can raise. Neither of these justifications, however, are sufficient to
sustain the natural resource rule in the face of the FSIA's plain language
and the Supreme Court's interpretations of it in Nelson and Weltover. Con-
venience alone cannot exempt courts from undertaking the sensitive legal
analysis that the FSIA mandates. Indeed, the MOL rule undercuts the basic
premise of that statute by allowing states to claim immunity for conduct
that is commercial in all but one sense-it involves a natural resource. 76
71. 643 F. Supp. 2d 382, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
72. Id. at 400.
73. See 649 F. Supp. at 595-96.
74. Id. at 596.
75. See In re Potash Antitrust Litig., 686 F. Supp. 2d 816, 823 (N.D. 111. 2010).
76. See 28 U.S.C. § 1602 ("Under international law, states are not immune from the
jurisdiction of foreign courts insofar as their commercial activities are concerned, and
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II. The Sedco Test
A. In re Complaint of Sedco
Two years before MOL, a district court in Texas confronted the com-
mercial activity exception in a case involving natural resources and fol-
lowed a very different path, albeit with the same outcome. Following a
1979 oil spill in the Bay of Campeche, 77 American plaintiffs sued state-
owned Mexican oil companies (including Pemex) in tort.7 8 Pemex then
filed a motion to dismiss based on the FSIA.79 The district court began its
analysis by acknowledging the commercial character of Pemex as a
national oil corporation. 80 The court then explained that although not
every act done by a foreign state that a private citizen could replicate quali-
fies as commercial, "[t]here is little doubt that where a foreign nation
enters into the world marketplace to purchase or sell goods, it has engaged
in commercial activity for purposes of the FSIA."8 1 A contractual agree-
ment, the court noted, though not "essential to a finding of commercial
activity,"8 2 is nevertheless "often indicative of such conduct. '8 3 The court
then engaged in a fact-based assessment of Pemex's actions to reach its
conclusion that the commercial activity exception did not apply:
Here, Pemex was engaged in drilling an exculpatory oil well in its patrimo-
nial waters, the Bay of Campeche. The data derived from this exploration
was integral to the Mexican government's long range planning and policy
making process concerning the production and utilization of state-owned
minerals. Such policy is not made by Pemex, but is formed by higher levels
of government [including] .. .various government ministries .... Pemex
had not entered into a contract with anyone for the oil and gas produced
from the IXTOC I well, nor had it contracted with a United States business to
drill the well .... Acting by authority of Mexican law within its national
territory and in intragovernmental cooperation with other branches of the
Mexican government, Pemex was not engaged in commercial activity as con-
templated by Congress in the FSIA when the IXTOC I well was drilled.8 4
The court ended with an observation that control over mineral resources
was still a basic attribute of sovereignty, and "short of actually selling these
resources on the world market, decisions and conduct concerning them are
their commercial property may be levied upon for the satisfaction of judgments ren-
dered against them in connection with their commercial activities.").
77. An explosion on the IXTOC I oil platform caused 140 million gallons of oil to
pour into the Bay of Campeche. It remains the third largest oil disaster to date, behind
the Deepwater Horizon and Gulf War spills. See 10 Largest Oil Spills in History, THE
TELEGRAPH (Oct. 7, 2011), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/australiaand
thepacific/newzealand/8812598/10-argest-oil-spills-in-history.html [https://perma.cc/
W7UA-E8JG].
78. Sedco, Inc., 543 F. Supp. at 564, 572.
79. Id. at 564.
80. See id. at 565.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 566.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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uniquely governmental in nature."8 5
The Sedco court's natural resource analysis, as excerpted above, can be
broken down into three factors:
1) The geographical location of the natural resource
2) The degree of government control over the natural resource and its
exploitation
3) The existence of a for-profit contract between the state and a private
party.8
6
The first factor asks whether the resource is located within the defendant
state's territory. This should be a straightforward inquiry for courts in
most cases, except perhaps for those instances involving disputed bor-
ders.87 The second factor examines the degree of government control over
the natural resource and its exploitation. Here, courts should ask if the
foreign state government crafted the policies for exploiting the natural
resource, and if state agencies or entities implemented these initiatives or if
they delegated implementation to a private party. A significant level of gov-
ernment control over natural resource exploitation and transactions indi-
cates that the state's conduct is closer to sovereign than commercial in
nature. As a policy matter, federal courts should also be more inclined to
allow immunity when natural resources are intertwined with foreign state
policies in this fashion. Finally, the third factor asks if the foreign state
defendant has entered into a for-profit contract with a private party for
exploiting the natural resource. If such a contract exists, then it is more
likely that the "outward form" of the state's conduct is commercial-under
Weltover, this is the critical inquiry.88
In Sedco, all three factors militated against a finding of commercial
activity. First, the oil well was located within Mexico's undisputed territo-
rial waters. 89 Second, multiple government agencies exercised control over
the drilling operation as part of the state's planning process for utilizing
mineral deposits.90 Third, Pemex had not formed a contract with any pri-
vate party in order to sell or license the products that the drilling operation
85. Id. (emphasis added).
86. Id.
87. For an interactive map of ongoing border disputes around the world, see A World
of Disputes Territories, METRocosM, http://metrocosm.com/disputed-territories-
map.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2019).
88. Weltover, 504 U.S. at 617.
89. Sedco, Inc., 543 F. Supp. at 566.
90. Id. ("The data derived from this exploration was integral to the Mexican govern-
ment's long range planning and policy making process concerning the production and
utilization of state-owned minerals. Such policy is not made by Pemex, but is formed by
higher levels of government. Mexican law, however, mandates that Pemex gather infor-
mation concerning these resources and create programs to implement the six-year
national development plan devised by the various government ministries and adopted
by the President of Mexico."). See also id. at 567 ("Pemex, in this case, was executing a
national plan formulated at the highest levels of the Mexican government by exploring
for Mexico's natural resources.").
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was likely to produce. 9 1
When applied to the facts of MOL, this multi-factor Sedco test suggests
that Bangladesh should not have benefited from sovereign immunity. Ban-
gladesh could likely show that the first factor weighs in their favor, since
the rhesus monkeys were located within its borders.92 The other two fac-
tors, however, do not cut in their favor. Part of the licensing agreement at
the center of the dispute required the plaintiffs to construct and operate
their own breeding farm.93 This suggests that Bangladesh was ceding
immediate oversight of its resource to a third party, rather than delegating
control to a government agency or entity. Finally, the licensing agreement
constituted a for-profit contract with a private party, specifying the quan-
tity of monkeys that the plaintiff would be permitted to export and the
amount that it would have to pay Bangladesh for them.94
What advantages does the Sedco test have over MOL's natural resource
rule? First, the Sedco test moves away from natural resource rule's broad
sweep-which consigns too many cases to the outskirts of the commercial
activity exception-by encouraging a case-specific, fact-based analysis. The
hypothetical application to the facts of MOL demonstrates as much. The
Sedco test therefore expands the commercial activity exception to the
advantage of plaintiffs with meritorious claims, reducing the number of
cases that courts will dismiss for lack of jurisdiction solely because a natu-
ral resource is involved.
The Sedco test is also more sensitive to the FSIA's plain language and
the Supreme Court's decisions in Weltover and Nelson. Both the control
and for-profit factors direct attention towards the "outward form of the con-
duct that the foreign state performs"95 in a way that the natural resource
rule simply did not. As such, the Sedco test better serves the FSIA's under-
lying purpose to ensure that states do not benefit from immunity when
they act in a commercial capacity, even where their conduct implicates nat-
ural resources.9 6 Finally, the test is still administrable because it only asks
judges to consider three factors, and it provides enough space at the mar-
gins for desirable outcomes in borderline cases.9 7
Replacing the natural resource rule with the Sedco test does come with
some of the downsides that accompany any multi-factor test, including
91. Id. ("Pemex had not entered into a contract with anyone for the oil and gas pro-
duced from the IXTOC I well[.]").
92. See MOL, Inc., 736 F.2d at 1327.
93. See MOL, Inc. v. Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, 572 F. Supp. 79, 80-81 (D. Or.
1983).
94. See id.
95. Weltover, 504 U.S. at 617.
96. See Foster, supra note 12, at 402 (noting that the FSIA's drafters "explained that
entering into a contract to construct a government building or carrying on a mineral
extraction enterprise should be considered commercial activities ... despite the fact that
both endeavors often require governmental permits.").
97. For example, the "for-profit" element of the contract prong means that this factor
would not weigh in favor of finding commercial activity where a state loaned out antiqui-
ties or cultural artifacts for research purposes, assuming arguendo that such objects
would count as natural resources.
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decision costs and unpredictable outcomes due to increased judicial dis-
cretion.98 The Sedco test requires what Patrick M. McFadden calls result-
balancing, wherein the product of the analysis "is neither a statement of
fact nor a rule of law, but the disposition of the case."99 This disposition,
however, is precisely what the FSIA empowered courts and judges to do in
the first place. The statute's preamble declares that "the determination by
United States courts of the claims of foreign states to immunity would
serve the interests of justice and would protect the rights of both foreign
states and litigants."'100 This is a strong endorsement of the judiciary's
capacity to resolve foreign immunity questions. 101 There is nothing in that
language to suggest Congress would be concerned with the additional flex-
ibility that a multi-factor inquiry like the Sedco test gives to courts.
Moreover, case-by-case balancing is especially appropriate in a juris-
dictional context. It is a foundational legal principle that no court may
hear a case unless it is satisfied that it has jurisdiction. 10 2 Where Congress
has dictated the applicable jurisdictional rules through a statute like the
FSIA, "a court faced with a claim of immunity must be sensitive to the
particular facts of the case."'1 3 Additional decision costs are worthwhile at
this stage of the litigation because the court needs to get the jurisdictional
question right before proceeding to a lengthy and expensive adjudication
on the merits. 10 4 Balancing tests also have other well-recognized advan-
tages: they "refine[ ] the process of judicial review... soften[ I the rigors of
absolutes, [and] make[ I room for judgment and for sensitivity to differ-
ences of degree.' 05 All of these benefits are essential to a court addressing
the basic question of whether or not it has jurisdiction.
There is one further distinction between Sedco and the MOL case: the
MOL plaintiffs sued for breach of contract, 10 6 while the Sedco plaintiffs
brought a tort claim.10 7 This formal difference, however, does not affect
98. See generally Patrick M. McFadden, The Balancing Test, 29 B.C. L. REV. 585
(1988) (discussing the use of judicial balancing tests for constitutional statutory inter-
pretation, in conflict with "rule-based reasoning.").
99. Id. at 600.
100. 28 U.S.C. § 1602.
101. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Foreign State Immunity in Europe, 5 N.Y. INT'L L. REv.
51, 61-62 (1992) ("In the United States, the core bases of immunity are prescribed in
such utterly ambiguous terms that the [Act] leaves a large measure of discretion in the
hands of the courts.").
102. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869) ("Without jurisdiction, the
court cannot proceed at all in any case. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and
when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing
the fact and dismissing the cause.").
103. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Med. Ctr., 877 F.2d at 579.
104. Bolivarian Republic of Venez. v. Helmerich & Payne Int'l Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct.
1312, 1317 (2017) (noting that "consistent with foreign sovereign immunity's basic
objective, namely, to free a foreign sovereign from suit, the court should normally ...
reach a decision about immunity as near to the outset of the case as is reasonably
possible.").
105. Louis Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78 COLUM. L.
REv. 1022, 1047 (1978).
106. See MOL, Inc., 736 F.2d at 1327-28.
107. See Sedco, Inc., 543 F. Supp. at 566-67.
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the Sedco test's viability. Courts must determine whether a foreign state is
immune, and by extension whether the commercial activity exception
applies, independent of the case's procedural posture. What matters for
the FSIA's purposes is the identity of the defendant and the nature of their
conduct, not the claim that the plaintiff brings. From an evidentiary stand-
point, a breach of contract plaintiff might be able to meet the Sedco test's
third prong more easily than a tort plaintiff (presumably, the existence of a
for-profit contract in that hypothetical case would be the reason why they
are suing), but even in a tort case the court should still look to the exis-
tence of for-profit contracts between the defendant state and private parties
to determine if the state's conduct was commercial.' 0 8
B. The Foster Rule
The Sedco test that this Note proposes is not the only option that has
been suggested for situating natural resources within the commercial activ-
ity exception. Addressing these alternative proposals demonstrates that
the Sedco test is not just preferable to the natural resource rule, but that it is
the best way to approach this issue.
In a recent article, Professor George K. Foster suggested that courts
should "ask whether [an FSIA case involving natural resources] would
require the court to evaluate, and potentially second-guess, the perform-
ance of any sovereign functions by the foreign state. If the claim would not
require the court to do so, then it is potentially within the commercial
activity exception."'1 9 Professor Foster then went on to specify that:
[E]xercises of governmental authority contemplated in a contract [should]
retain their sovereign character, but ... U.S.-connected claims relating to the
contract [should] come within the commercial activity exception so long as
their elements do not actually and necessarily place any of the sovereign
functions in issue. 110
Professor Foster's proposed standards for negotiating natural resources
and the commercial activity exception are flawed. A standard that encour-
ages courts to ask if their jurisdictional ruling would disrupt the sovereign
functions of other countries is nothing but the act of state doctrine by
another name. 1" Under LAM II, the act of state doctrine still exists, 112 but
that does not negate the need for a judicially manageable statutory stan-
dard to deal with natural resource related claims-this is the hole that the
Sedco test fills.
108. A breach-of-contract plaintiff might also have an easier time showing that their
claim is "based upon" commercial activity, unlike, for example, the tort plaintiff in Nel-
son. See, e.g., Nelson, 507 U.S. at 356. As explained in Part I however, the Sedco test is
not relevant to this step of the commercial activity analysis.
109. Foster, supra note 12, at 405 (emphasis in original).
110. Id. at 407.
111. See, e.g., Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252 (describing the act of state doctrine as the
legal principle according to which "the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on
the acts of the government of another, done within its own territory.").
112. See Part I.A.
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The second half of Foster's standard, which emphasizes whether a nat-
ural resource claim is connected to the United States, improperly grafts a
nexus requirement onto the commercial activity exception that is unsup-
ported by the statutory text. FSIA § 1603(d) instructs courts assessing
commercial activity to examine the "nature of the course of conduct,"1 13
but says nothing about whether that conduct needs to be connected to the
United States. The presence of an explicit nexus requirement elsewhere in
FSIA § 1605(a)(2) counsels against inserting one into § 1603(d). 114 Had
Congress wanted to include such a requirement, they would have written it
into the statute themselves.
A variation on Professor Foster's rule would focus on the nature of the
state's regulatory behavior. Under this theory, where a foreign state owns
a natural resource in a commercial sense, transactions related to that
resource are commercial activity.1 15 Where a foreign state regulates a nat-
ural resource, however, and consents via contract (i.e., a licensing agree-
ment) to change, repeal, or disapply its regulations, then these transactions
are not commercial activity. 1 16 The Fourth Circuit provided a useful
response to this approach in Globe Nuclear Services. The next section dis-
cusses this case in greater detail, but in brief, the court rejected the defen-
dant's claim that it should be immune because it was "not merely dealing
in uranium; it [was] regulating its inventory of [uranium hexafluoride] and
LEU supply in a manner that no private player can."'1 1 7 Circuit Judge J.
Michael Luttig did not find this distinction persuasive:
[T]his stylized usage of the term "regulation" proves far too much. Under
Tenex's usage, it would also follow that a government which enters into a
contract to purchase bullets for its army is "regulating" its bullet supply, or
that the government of Argentina, in Weltover, was "regulating" its money
supply.... [A]cceptance of Tenex's usage of "regulation" is not only incon-
sistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Weltover, but would also strip
the "commercial activity" exception of much, if not all, of its meaning, for a
foreign state would almost always be able to characterize its activities as sov-
ereign "regulation" of some subject matter related to the conduct at issue. 118
113. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
114. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a)(2) ("commercial activity carried on in the United States by
the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere
and that act causes a direct effect in the United States[.]").
115. See e-mail from Zachary D. Clopton, Associate Professor of Law at Cornell Law
School, to author (Apr. 13, 2018, 18:22 EST) (on file with Cornell International Law
Journal).
116. Id.
117. Globe Nuclear Servs. & Supply, Ltd. v. AO Techsnabexport, 376 F.3d 282, 289
(4th Cir. 2004).
118. Id. at 289-90. Cf. Mark B. Feldman, The United States Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act of 1976 in Perspective: A Founder's View, 35 Ir'L CoMp. L.Q. 302, 310 (1986)
("[A] case can certainly be made that regulation of natural resources by political authori-
ties is not a commercial activity, particularly where the regulation is effected through the
taxing power .... However, a critical distinction must be maintained between regulation
and transactions. If a sovereign State makes and then breaks a contract... it should be
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Although Judge Luttig may have overstated the deceptive inclinations of
foreign-state defendants in this passage, his basic point that governments
can easily represent their behavior as regulatory remains sound. This stan-
dard therefore comes with the same flaw as the natural resource rule,
because it would allow states to escape the commercial activity exception
for manifestly commercial conduct. The only difference under this theory
is that states would point to "regulation" rather than the natural resource
itself for justification.
C. Sedco Test and Existing Case Law
There are two recent decisions that have applied limited versions of the
natural resource rule: Globe Nuclear Services and Oceanic Exploration
Co. 1 19 Both provide useful case studies for the multi-factor Sedco test that
this Note proposes, indicating that it yields coherent solutions when
applied to actual fact patterns.
In Globe Nuclear Services, a Delaware corporation sued a state-owned
Russian company (Tenex). 1 20 The plaintiff alleged that Tenex had
breached its contract to supply them with uranium hexafluoride extracted
from decommissioned nuclear warheads. 12 1 Here, the Fourth Circuit held
that the commercial activity exception did apply because the "entrance into
a contract to supply a private party with uranium hexafluoride is the very
type of action by which private parties engage in 'trade and traffic or com-
merce."' 122 The Fourth Circuit rejected Tenex's contention that uranium
hexafluoride was a finite natural resource belonging to Russia, 123 articulat-
ing instead a limited conception of the holdings in MOL and Rush-
Presbyterian:
[Wje read the decision in MOL and the dicta in Rush to stand not for the
overly broad proposition that all contracts involving "natural resources" or
their derivative products constitute sovereign activity, but for the narrower
and much sounder principle that the grant of a license to operate within
sovereign territory and to extract natural resources from within that terri-
tory is sovereign activity. 124
Only the third factor of the Sedco test weighs in favor of a commercial
activity finding in Globe Nuclear Services because Tenex's long-term supply
agreements with American customers for uranium hexafluoride constitute
for-profit contracts with private parties. 125 The first and second factors,
however, cut the other way. In addition to the warheads being within Rus-
held accountable for damages for breach of contract in any court of competent
jurisdiction.").
119. See generally Oceanic Exploration Co. v. ConocoPhillips, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 72231 (D.D.C. Sept. 21, 2006).
120. Globe Nuclear, 376 F.3d at 283-84.
121. Id. at 284.
122. Id. at 289.
123. Id. at 291.
124. Id. The reference to "derivative products" suggests that the Fourth Circuit might
not have considered this as a natural resources case in the first place.
125. Globe Nuclear, 376 F.3d at 289.
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sian territory, Tenex carried out its extraction procedures pursuant to a
1993 agreement with the United States "Concerning the Disposition of
Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Extracted from Nuclear Weapons." 12 6
The Russian government appointed Tenex as its sole agent in this deal,
which obligated them to remove and dilute high grade uranium from the
warheads before selling it back to either the United States Enrichment Cor-
poration or other private American utility firms like the plaintiff.12 7 This
close government control of Tenex's activities, as well as the location of the
uranium hexafluoride, indicates that under the Sedco test their conduct
should be deemed sovereign rather than commercial.
In Oceanic Exploration Co., plaintiffs sued after the Timor Sea Desig-
nated Authority (TSDA) after it did not award them a government contract
to develop oil and gas on the seabed between East Timor and Australia.' 28
The district court concluded that the defendant agency was not immune
under the FSIA because it had been granted the authority to "lay out the
terms of a joint commercial venture between the TSDA and the private
companies to produce and market petroleum and natural gas from the
Timor Gap."'12 9 The district court described the contracts that the defen-
dant had entered into with other private parties, under which the defen-
dant set up profit-sharing arrangements and "reserve[d] the right to market
petroleum covered by the ... contract."1 30
In Oceanic Exploration Co., the natural resource was located within the
defendant's territorial waters. 131 There were, however, far fewer indicia of
direct government control in this case as opposed to Globe Nuclear Services.
Timor's national constitution had a single provision that "asserted sover-
eignty over its natural resources, and specifically nullified any previous
concessions not ratified by the new independent government."1 3 2 The
TSDA was the product of a treaty between Timor and Australia that author-
ized it "to oversee the granting of exploration and development conces-
sions" to third parties like the plaintiff.13 3 This structure generates
government control that is much more diffuse than the oversight in Globe
Nuclear Services. There, the agreement between Russia and the United
States dictated the specific terms and procedures for exploiting, extracting,
and selling the natural resource. 13 4 Here, the government's control ends
with policing access to the resource in the first place. The third factor also
shifts the balance significantly towards commercial activity. Not only did
the Timorese defendant routinely enter for-profit contracts with private par-
ties, it also retained the absolute right to sell any oil or gas that might be
126. Id. at 284.
127. See id.
128. Oceanic Exploration Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. at *6.
129. Id. at *17.
130. Id. at *18.
131. Oceanic Exploration Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. at *6.
132. Id. at *9.
133. Id.
134. Globe Nuclear, 376 F.3d at 284.
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discovered. 135 Such an arrangement mirrors the closing words in Sedco,
which described the circumstances under which a natural resource can no
longer shield a state from the consequences of its commercial activity: "[a]
very basic attribute of sovereignty is the control over its mineral resources
• . .short of actually selling these resources on the world market."13 6
The fact that the Sedco test yields different outcomes in these two cases
demonstrates that this Note is not arguing for a broad inversion of MOL
that would sweep all, or even most, disputes involving natural resources
into the commercial activity exception. Instead, the Sedco test allows for a
rigorous, case-by-case analysis that goes further than a simple classification
of any natural resource transaction as sovereign activity. Such a bright-line
rule distorts the commercial activity exception and is at odds with the
FSIA's basic objective of granting limited immunity to sovereign states.
Conclusion
This Note set forth a new, multi-factor standard-dubbed the Sedco test
after its foundational case-for situating natural resources within the
FSIA's commercial activity exception. The Sedco test looks to: 1) the geo-
graphical location of the natural resource; 2) the degree of government
control over the natural resource and its exploitation; and 3) the existence
of a for-profit contract between the state and a private party.
The Sedco test is responsive to the Supreme Court's current jurispru-
dence on the commercial activity exception and offers courts a workable
alternative to the overbroad natural resource rule. The path that judges
must tread in order to solve the cases that this Note discusses is not an easy
one: the commercial activity carveout is a specific exception layered on top
of a broader exemption that the FSIA adds to general rules of jurisdiction
so that sovereign states can benefit from immunity. There is also no deny-
ing that the term "commercial activity" is a perplexing term thanks to the
FSIA's opaque wording. Within this difficult area of the law, disputes
involving natural resources pose an especially thorny problem-how are
courts supposed to categorize transactions that appear for all intents and
purposes to be commercial, but are negotiated for commodities that the
state alone purports to possess?
This Note asserts that the natural resource rule should not answer that
question, and it is not alone in that contention. In 1986, one of the FSIA's
drafters declared the MOL decision to be "very troublesome ... [because]
the Court's reasoning that a private party could not have made this sort of
agreement seems to flout the intention of Congress. . . .With all due
respect, this decision sets back the law 30 years".137 Three decades of
jurisprudence have confirmed this author's anxieties, as courts have con-
135. Oceanic Exploration Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. at *18.
136. Sedco, Inc., 543 F. Supp. at 566 (emphasis added).
137. Feldman, supra note 118, at 309. Notwithstanding, Feldman is critical of the
Sedco case, which he identifies as another point of difficulty in US courts' attempts to
grapple with the meaning of commercial activity. See id. at 310.
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tinually deployed the natural resource rule to undercut the FSIA's commer-
cial activity exception. In contrast, the Sedco test that this Note proposes
both serves FSIA's underlying policies and remains faithful to its plain text
by directing courts to examine the outward form of the sovereign state's
conduct. It is high time for courts to extricate themselves from MOL's
ham-fisted grip, and the Sedco test is the ideal way for them to do so.
